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BOOK REVIEWS
HAND BooK ON iHE LAW OF EVIDENCE, BASED UPON THE MoDERN LAW OF
EVIDENCE BY CHARI.ES FREDERICK CHAMBERLAYNE. By Arthur
Blakemore and DeWitt C. Moore, of Boston and New York respectively. Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1919; pp. xxxiv,

,V.
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The lawyer who, for the last two decades has kept abreast of the literature
of the law, is appreciative of the fact that no branch of the old law has received such scientific and scholarly treatment, as has the law of evidence, and
few of the more modern fields have been as thoroughly and intelligently cul-.
tivated. Led by Professor Thayer in that incomparable series ·of essays gathered under one title in his "Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
Law," followed by Professor Wigmore with his edition of Greenleaf's first
volume, and later by his great work "Evidence in Trials at Common Law," and
this work of Professor Wigmore followed in turn by the exhaustive treatise
of Mr. Chamberlayne who had previously given us the best American editions
of both Taylor and Best, we are driven to acknowledge the field well tilled,
even had no others been working in it. It is to be recognized however, that
others have during this period done work of real practical value though, it may
be, not possessing the same degree of scientific merit.
As was to be expected, with treatment so exhaustive and so competently
done as that in Chamberlayne's "Modern Law of Evidence," an abridgment in
some form was certain fo be forth-coming, as making the work less physically
cumbersome for that practical use for which a text on the law of evidence
is so often demanded by the trial lawyer.
It is to be observed in the outset that the cover title has a tendency to
mislead. It is not "Chamberlayne's Hand Book on Evidence" but rather that
of Blackmore and Moore. The reviewer is convinced that the editors of this
"Hand Book" have produced a useful aid to the trial lawyer, l:)ut cannot esc;yie the conclusion that the work lacks that clearness, literary finish and to
some extent, accuracy of statement sure to have been found in it, had the
work been done by the author of the original treatise. While in any abridgment literary style must in a measure be sacrificed, it is almost certain to
suffer more at the hands of another than ab the hands of the author himself. From the author's discussion of the principles involved in that "no man's
land" between fact and opinion, the editors have taken this sentence: "Modern judicial administration recognizes that! the spontaneous intuitive action of
the mind, approving as it does, the uniformity of nature, is far more trust~
worthy than an act of volitional reasoning, subject to variations in operation
which attend moral uniformity." (p. 515). This sentence in its original setting
is illuminating, but in its isolation in the "Hand Book" lacks something of
clarity and has little to help him who seeks information. It illustrates the
difficulties of the abridger, particularly of him who attempts this service for
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another, and who of necessity must lack in some measure a full appreciation
of that other's point of view.
No one is always right, but it is quite certain that the author would not
have fallen into such an error as have the editors in their discussion o-€ what
they are pleased to call the "pseudo-presumption of good character." '!'hey
say: "It is a familiar rule of procedure, elsewhere considered, that unless, or
until, the accused in a criminal case shall open the issue of character, no inference shall be drawn that he did the act in question· because he had the
traits of character which would permit or predispose him to do it." (§ 476.)
The logical inference from such a statement is, that when the defendant has
introduced evidence of his claimed good character, then the state may give
evidence of his claimed bad character as a basis for the fofere nee "that he
did the act in question because he had traits of character which would permit
or predispose him to do it." No principle is better settled in the law of evidence than that such use cannot, save in one or two quite exceptional cases,
be made of the evidence of bad character. One might look for this error to
be corrected in the more general discussion of the evidentiary use of character in the subsequent section referred to, (§ 1029), but the correction is not
found, the error, on the contrary is perpetuated.
But these illustrations are not typical of many errors in either the exercise
of judgment in the abridging process, or in the statement of the law. They
are rather illustrative of some errors more likely to appear where the abridg~
ing process is worked out by a stranger. It is seldom true that the literary
forms of two authors run well together, and they are certain to differ much
in their measures of substantive values.
It would be difficult to speak too extravagently of the work abridged, and
the abridgment will be welcomed by the profession as a useful book, notwithstanding it enters a field far from.barren before it appeared.
The book is printed on thin paper in large type and with flexible cover, too
large for the pocket but convenient to handle.
V. H. LAN~.

Tn

Pos1TION oP Fom>rGN CoRPoRATIONS IN AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAr, LAw.

A Contribution to the History and Theory of Juristic Persons in
Anglo-American Law. By Gerard Carl Henderson, A.B., LL.B.
Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, II. Cambridge, University
Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press;
1918. pp. xix, 199.
,
This is an illuminating and discriminating discussion and criticism of the
Ameri~ decisiOns,-mostly'Federal,-upon many of the perplexing problems
arising under the United States Constitution, when a corporation of one
state claims rights in another state.
· The constitutional provisions involved are: "Congress shall have power
- to regulate commerce among the several states'' (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) ; "The
judicial power shall extend to controversies between citizens of different
states" (Art. III, § 2); "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
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the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" (Art. IV, § 2) ;
"No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Amend. XIV, §r.)
In the ltltrod11etion the author calls attention to two theories as to the
nature of a corporation,-as a highly privileged body with quasi-governmental
powers such as the East India Co., or the Virginia Co., of r6oo and r607; or
only as a convenient mechanism for carrying on business and trade by a
group of persons.
In Chapter II,-Begimiings of American Law, there is sketched the change
from the old view, of special grants and privileges by King's Charter or
special legislative act to the modern practice of freedom of incorporation under general laws.
The real discussion begins in Chapter III, The Rule of Comity, and
starts out with Marshalrs and Taney's views of the nature of a corporation
as a person and citizen . These questions arose as to the right of a corporation to sue in the federal courts, and the right to do business away from
home. In r809, Bank of U. · S. v. Deveau:i:, 5 Cr. 6I, MARSHALL, C. ]. said
a corporation is an artificial being and cannot be a citizen; only its members
can be such; but if there is the requisite diversity between them and the
other party, they may sue in the federal courts in the corporate name. In
1839, whet:\ the question was as to the right of a corporation of one state to
do business in another, 'Vebster argued, that if citizens of Pennsylvania can
sue in their corporate name in Alabama, they have the same right under the
privileges and immunities clause to trade there in that name. TAN:€Y, C. ].
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, I3 Pet. 5I9, said, No. The corporation is an
artificial person; it has no legal existence outside the creating state; it must
dwell there and cannot migrate; its existence at home may·be recognized
abroad; but this is a matter of comity in another state, and not a matter of
right; it may be represented by agents abroad, who may contract for it there;
but such contracts are its contracts, not those of its members individually,
otherwise they would be individually liable on them, as partners.
These decisions left the citizenship question in a very unsatisfactory shape,
and the last one raised numerous questions as to suits against foreign corporations.
In Chapter IV, the author treats of The Citizenship of Corporations.
Five years after the Earle case,.the court in Railway Co. v. Letson (I844),
2 How. 497, declared a corporation may be treated as a citizen of the creating
state, for the purpose of suit in the federal courts, as much as a natural person. But in r853 after Mr. Justice DAN!Er, in a dissenting opinion, pointed
out if that was true we might have a corporation member of the legislature,
or president, or commander of the army or navy, the court got frightened at
its boldness in the Letson case, executed a double somersault in Marshall v.
B. & 0. Ry. (1853) I6 How. 3I4, holding a corporation, for federal jurisdiction, is not and cannot be a citizen; only its members can be such; but they
are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the creating state, although all of
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them live elsewhere. This of course, landed the court in immediate confusion
when the suit is between the corporation and one of its members living out· side the creating state, or when there has been a consolidation of two or more
corporations created by different states. The author reviews these cases, and
the unsatisfactory conclusions reached.
In 1868, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, after the Letson case, Webster's argument that a corporation was a citizen within the privileges and immunities
clause was pushed with vigor, but the court, going back to the doctrine that
"a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges," held, contrary to the interpretation of similar words in treaties and international relations generally, that the constitutional provision applied only to such privileges and immunities "as are common to citizens under their laws and constitutions by virtue of their being citizens,"-otherwise no state could limit the
number of corporations doing business within its borders, for if it created a
single c~rporation for any purpose, it would open the door for a flood of such
from other states. This, however, left open a big question, when general
laws gave a common right to all citizens to incorporate.
If, as Chief Justice TANEY said, a corporation exists only at home, and
cannot migrate, how and where can it be sued, and served with summons?
The author treats of this in Chapter V, Jurisdicti01i of the, Courts over Foreig1i Corporations, and shows that there had been, in the state courts, two
theories: one, when a corporation of state A establishes a place of business in
state B, and does business there, it is actually there, and can be sued and
served with summons there; the other, that while the corporation is not there,
it i11Jpliedly consents to be subject to the laws of state B, and can be sued and
served with summons there if the laws of B soJ)rovide. This latter view was
taken'. by the supreme court in La Fayette Insurance v. French (1855) 18 How.
404; but the corporation must be doing business in the state, and the agent
must be really representative to constitute due process. St. Clair v. Co~
(1882) !o6 U. S. 50. This consent, however, is peculiar: since the corporation has no.existence outside the creating state, and since jurisdiction cannot
be conferred on the federal courts, either by c:onsent of the p~rties, or by
state legislation,-yet if the legislature requires a corporation to consent to be
found within the state as the condition of doing business there, then if it does
business there, the courts, by a fiction can find it within the state although from
its very nature it cannot be there. E~ Parte Schollenberger (1877) 96 U. S.
369. But in Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1908), after the court had again
held that a corporation can be an inhabitant and resident of the creating state
only, it was ruled that a British corporation could be sued in the federal court
irr New York, by a citizen bf New Jersey.
The Power to E~clude Foreig1i Corporatioru, is the title of Chapter VI,
and discusses C. J. TAmy's theory that a corporation does business in a
foreign state only by the comity of that state, which can be withdrawn at any
time. This was affirmed by Paul v. Virginia, and after holding in 1870, that
a foreign corporation, even though it had agreed not to do so, could as its
constitutional right remove a suit against it into the federal court, but for
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so doing the state could revoke its license and expel it from the state. Doyle

v. Insura11ce Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535.
Chapter VII, treats of Foreig11 Corporations and the Commerce Clause..
Pa11l v. Virginia held that insurance was not commerce, and this is still the
doctrine of the court. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge &c. (1913)
231 U. S. 493. In 1877, it was ruled that the states could not exclude a corporation with authority from the United States to engage in interstate commerce from doing so. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., g6 U. S. 1.
It follows that a state could not tax the right to engage in interstate commerce, Glouc11ester Ferry Co. v. Penn. (1884), II4 U.S. lg6, although it could
tax by a non-discriminating property tax the fairly valued proportion in the
stat~ of all its property tangible and. intangible. Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio (18g7) 165 U. S. 194; but a foreign telegraph company doing interstate
and local business cannot be required to pay a license fee on all its capital
stock for the privilege of doing a local business. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas (1910) 216 U.S. l., contrary to what had been held in 1888, and 1892,
as to mining companies, Hom v. Silver Mining Co. (1892) 143 U.S. 305.
The author then in Chapter VIII goes back to The Doctrine of U11co11stit1ttio11al Conditioiis, such as the right of a state to exclude an insurance
company from doing business in the state after it violated its promise not
to remove a suit against it to the federal case as in the Doyle case above.
Eleven years after this was decided it seemed to be overruled by Barron v.
Bumside (1887) 121 U. S., 186, holding an insurance agent could not be pun•
ished criminally for doing business in the state for an insurance companj
that had failed to agree not to remove suits into the federal courts, since
such an agreement would be void, and could not be made the basis of a
criminal prosecution. Then in 1go6 the court again held that an insurance
company's license could be revoked if it did remove suits to the federal
courts contrary to its agreement, Security Mut. Iiis. Co. v. Previtt, 202 U. S.
¢;but in 1916 this could not be done to a corporation engaged in interstate
commerce. Doiw.ld v. Phila_delphifl. &q, <;o., 24~ U.S. 329. Also in 1910 there
was a. series of cases, such as P1.1Uma.1• C:o. v. Kansas ~16 C. S. 56, holding
that a state could not impose a tax O!.J. the property of such a company, both
in and out of the state, for the privilege of do.i,ng lcx;;;il business.
After the court had held that a corporation was not a citizen protected
under the privileges and immupiti.es clatlse, corporations turned to the
theory that; they were persQ11s, under the d11e process a.nd equal pro~ecti1211
clauses of the XIV Amendment. The author discusses this matt~r in Chapter
IX, Foreign Corporations and the Fourteenth. A,mendme11t. It was a,t once
conceded that corporations were persons under the due p.rocesS" clause, l\lld
there has been no dispute on this proposition. But if C. J. TANJ>y's view that
a corporation dwelt only in the state of its creation, and could not migrate,
how could it be said to be within the jurisdiction of 31.J.Other state and. be entitled, to the equal protection of the laws there? In 18g8, it was held that in
order to be so protected it must be within the jurisdiction of the State.
Blake v. McClung 172 U. S. 239. How can it be? No very satisfactory
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answer has yet been given by the court. If it is engaged in interstate commerce, has entered the state by its consent an.I acquired property of a permanent kind, which cannot be easily disposed of, and \vhkh it uses in interstate commerce, it then is sufficiently within the State to be exempt from a
tax for doing local business that is not imposed on domestic corporations of
the same kind. Southern R.R. Co. v. Greene (I910) 2I6 U.S. 400. This, however does not prevent a state from taxing its own corporations (which are
undoubtedly within its jurisdiction) but doing a large business outside the
state on all of its capital stock, even if foreign corporations doing business.
in the state can be taxed only in such proportion of its capital stock as is
represented by the business in the state. Memphis &c. R. R. Co. v. Stiles
(I9I6) 242 U. S. III. This looks like a discrimination against its own corporations.
Chapter X, is a Critical Re-examination, of the theories as to the nature
of a corporation involved in the above very imperfectly outlined course of
decisions. The author examines with care in the foregoing chapters a large
number, about 300, of relevant cases, and points out what difficulty the courts
have had in fitting their theories of corporations to_ the very complex situations that arise. He, on the whole, perhaps favors the recognition of the
corporation as a citizen having civil capacity, for suits by and against it, and
to a much larger extent as a citizen under the privilege and immunities clause,
as to their functional capacity, under general incorporation laws of substantially the same character. It is doubtful whether the courts will come to this
latter policy. However this would be much nearer the Continental theories
set forth so admirably in Young's Foreig1i Companies and other Corporations.
The decisions upon these matters are in a constant flux, and it is impossible
co predict what the court will do in reference to many of the questions involved. Since this book was prepared, the court has recently handed down
several decisions, some of which probably modify the decisions reviewed by
the author. See Looney v. Crane Co. (I9I7) 245 U. S. I78, 38 S. Ct. 85;
foternational Paper Ca. v. Massachusetts (I9I8) 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct 292;
Cheney Brothers v. Massaclmsetts, (1918) 246 U. S. I47, 38 S. Ct 295;
Cudahy Packong Co. v. Minnesota (I9I8), 246 U. S. 450, 38 S. Ct 373;
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State (I9I8) 247 U. S. I32, 38 S. Ct.
444; Peck & Co. v. Lowe (I9I8) 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432; Union Pac. R.
R. Co. v. Pieblic Service Comm. (I9I8) 39 S. Ct 24; Wells Fargo & Co.
v. State (I9I8) 39 S. Ct. 48.
If Natura non it per salt1im, indicates that there is any such thing as natural law, then it would seem from the foregoing, as we may suspect from Mr.
Justice Hor.MES article 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40, that it does not have much place
in the decisions of the supreme cotirt, for the evolutions not to say gyrations,
disclosed by them show it proceeds quite frequently per salt111n.
The author has produced a valuable book. It is dedicated to Mr. Justice
BRANDEIS.

H. L. WILGUS.
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FOUR SOURCE BOOKS ON· INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS
LES CoNvtNTioNs :ET Dscr.ARATIONS DE LA HAYE DE 1899 F:r 1907- Accompagnees de tableaux des signatures, ratifications, et adhesions et des
textes des reserves. Avec une introduction de James Brown Scott.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp. xxxiii, 318.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, through its Division oi
International Law, publishes in this volume a French edition of one of the
most convenient source books now available on the results achieved at the
two Hague Peace Conferences. The volume contains an introduction by Mr.
Scott, a collection of documents relating to the calling of the two conferences, complete texts of final acts, conventions, and declarations, and an
accurate record of signatures, ratifications, adhesions, and reservations. 'fhc
texts of reservations are printed wherever available. The record of signatures, ratifications, adhesions, and reservations has been verified in the United
States Department of State and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
There is appended a list of delegates alphabetically arranged and a useful
table analj•tique. The volume affords a convenient and reliable source of information as to the content of the various conventions and declarations and
the extent to which they are now binding upon the participating states. It
has been published previously in English and Spanish. It is now issued in
in French in order that its contents may be still more widely available. The
French edition has the unique advantage of presenting! the documents in the
official text.
UNE CouR DI': JusTICE INT:ERNATIONAL:E. Par James Brown Scott. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp. vi, 269.
This volume'is also a French edition of matter previously published by the
Endowment in English. Part I contains the letter and memorandum, with
various documentary appendices, which Mr. Scott addressed to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in January, 1914 urging the establishment of a court of arbitral justice by the Netherlands and the eight great
powers. Part II contains Mr. Scott's tractate on "The Status .of the International Court of Justice," first published in July 1914, also with documentary
appendices.
THI': TREATIES OF 1785, 1799 AND 1828 BJ':TWEI':N THE UNITI':D STATI':S AND
PRUSSIA. As int;erpreted in opinions of attorneys general, decisions of courts, and diplomatic correspondence. Edited by James
Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1918; pp.
viii, 207.
Prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany in
1917, certain of the more important treaty relationships between the two

countries were defined in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1828
and in articles of the earlier treaties which the Treaty of 1828 revived. Mr.
Scott has brought together the English and French texts of the three historic
treaties in question, important federal court decisions and opinions of atior-
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neys general on questions arising thereunder, and a considerable body of
diplomatic correspondence relative to the controversy of I885-86 as to tonnage
dues, the case of the William P. Frye, and the case of the Appam. This col. lection will be useful for the student who desires to become acquainted
through original sources with the general subject matter of these diplomatic
controversies. It should be useful also in smaller libraries where many of
the sources are not available.
THS ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF I780 AND I8oo. A collection of official documents preceded by the views of representative publicists.. Edited
by James Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press,
I9I8; pp. xxxi, 698.
For a brief period before the entrance of the United States iI~to the world
war there was a measure of interest in the idea of an armed neutrality. The
documentary history of the principal American precedent for such a program
was published by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace under the title THE CoNTROVSRSY OVER NEUTRAL
RIGHTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, I797-I8oo. In the present
volume the same editor has collected the texts of the agreements, the orders
putting them into effect, and diplomatic correspondence relative to the leading European precedents for armed neutrality. The volume offers English
translations of many documents hitherto available only in foreign languages
and brings in.to convenient compass a mass of material which has been accessible only to the research student. More than one third of the book is devoted to extracts from American and foreign works on international law
concerning the armed neutralities. The extracts from foreign works are in
all cases rendered into English. The volume is a useful addition to the
Carnegie Endow~ent's rapidly expanding collection of source bocks on international questions.
E. D. DICKINSON.

